The Danger of Experimental Philosophers using Thought Experiments

November 22, 2009 by jmsytsma

I have been doing some work with Jonathan Livengood, and now David Rose, on folk judgments about causation, focusing on judgments with regard to several of the vignettes that Joshua Knobe gives in his dissertation (2006).  Specifically, we have looked at the case of Lauren and Jane; on Knobe’s original version of the story, it reads:

Lauren and Jane work for the same company.  They each need to use a computer for work sometimes.

Unfortunately, the computer isn’t very powerful.  If two people are logged on at the same time, it usually crashes.

So the company decided to institute an official policy.  It declared that Lauren would be the only one permitted to use the computer in the mornings and that Jane would be the only one permitted to use the computer in the afternoons.

As expected, Lauren logged on the computer the next day at 9:00 am.

But Jane decided to disobey the official policy. She also logged on at 9:00 am.

The computer crashed immediately.

Knobe uses this story to pump some intuitions about the role of permissibility (or more generally the normative status of an action) in judgments about causation.  He continues:

Here we would attribute the crash more to Lauren’s behavior than to Jane’s behavior. But why? The two factors appear to be similar in many ways. The most plausible hypothesis seems to be that this difference in people’s attributions stems from a difference in perceived normative status — i.e., from a sense that Jane was not doing anything wrong but Lauren really ought to have refrained from using the computer. (p. 68)

Note that the discussion of people’s attributions does not derive from an empirical study using the vignette; no such data is presented. Rather, Knobe uses the story as an intuition pump. This is perfectly fine. My concern is not with the use of a thought experiment, per se; rather, as Knobe is well known as an experimental philosopher, my concern is that there is a danger of researchers mistaking the intuition pumped for a conclusion drawn from empirical work testing people’s responses to questions about who caused the outcome in the story. In fact, I’ve seen several suggestions of this in the literature discussing this case, but perhaps the most clear example is in a recent paper by Roxborough, Cumby, and Fraser currently under review (“Causation, Morality & Atypicality”). They write:

Joshua Knobe (2006) claims that moral judgments play a direct role in folk attributions of causal responsibility. Knobe makes his case using data from a study in which he presented subjects with the following vignette: [see above]. Neither Jane nor Lauren logging on alone would have crashed the computer. Both Jane and Lauren had to be logged on for the computer to crash. Nevertheless, Knob’s subjects were significantly more willing to attribute causal responsibility for the computer crash to Jane than to Lauren. The only difference between Jane and Lauren seems to lie in the moral status of their actions: Jane broke a rule while Lauren did not. Knobe thus concluded that moral judgments influence folk attributions of causal responsibility. (p. 2)

Of course, there is no study in Knobe (2006), no subjects, and no significant result.  This is the danger of experimental philosophers using thought experiments.

Fortunately, in this case Knobe’s intuitions were good.  Jonathan and I have run a sequence of variations on the original Lauren and Jane case.  Two of those variations serve to test whether English-speakers really are more willing to attribute causal responsibility to Jane than to Lauren when Jane’s action is impermissible (compared to when there is no rule governing logging on to the computer).  As our goal was somewhat larger than simply to test people’s intuitions about the basic story, it has been expanded a bit to allow us to vary the timing of when Lauren and Jane log on (more on this in a subsequent post).  The results for the two conditions when Lauren and Jane log on at the same time follow Knobe’s prediction.

The two vignettes read as follows:

No permissibility information included:

Lauren and Jane both work for a company that uses a mainframe that can be accessed from terminals on different floors of its building. Though the company does not know it, the mainframe has recently become unstable, so that if more than one person is logged in at the same time, the system crashes.

One day, Lauren logged into the mainframe on the ground floor at the exact same time that Jane logged into the mainframe on the second floor. Lauren and Jane were both unaware that the other was logging in. Sure enough, the system crashed.

Permissibility information included:

Lauren and Jane both work for a company that uses a mainframe that can be accessed from terminals on different floors of its building. The mainframe has recently become unstable, so that if more than one person is logged in at the same time, the system crashes. Therefore, the company has instituted a temporary policy restricting the use of terminals so that two terminals are not used at the same time until the mainframe is repaired. The policy prohibits logging in to the mainframe from the terminal on any floor except the ground floor.

One day, Lauren logged into the mainframe on the authorized terminal on the ground floor at the exact same time that Jane logged into the mainframe on the unauthorized terminal on the second floor. Lauren and Jane were both unaware that the other was logging in. Sure enough, the system crashed.

Participants were randomly given one of the two vignettes, then asked to rank whether they agree or disagree with each of the two statements given below on a 7-point scale anchored at 1 with “strongly disagree,” at 4 with “neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly agree”:

1. Lauren caused the system to crash.
2. Jane caused the system to crash.

We collected responses for these two probes from 195 participants through the Philosophical Personality website.  38 participants were excluded because they were under 18 years of age, had taken the survey previously, or did not complete the demographic information portion of the survey.  Additionally, for the sake of comparison, 14 participants were excluded because they were non-native English speakers or because they had more than minimal training in philosophy.  The remaining 143 participants were 73.4% female, with an average age of 34.8 years, and ranging in age from 18 to 81 years old.

As expected, we found that participants in the “no permissibility information included” condition did not treat Lauren and Jane differently, tending to deny that either caused the system to crash (N=71; Lauren: M=2.70; Jane: M=2.70), while participants in the “permissibility information included” condition did treat them differently, tending to respond that Jane, but not Lauren, caused the system to crash (N=72; Lauren: M=2.42; Jane: M=5.21).  The results are shown graphically below.

Edit: Roxborough, Cumby, and Fraser have corrected their paper (and the revised version should be online in the near future).  They are hardly the only ones to have made this mistake, however.  For example, Christopher Hitchcock (2007, “Three Concepts of Causation”) indicates that Knobe and Fraser performed the experiment, presumably referring to the paper that became their (2008).  He writes: “[In] an experiment performed by Knobe and Fraser, subjects were presented a vignette in which two individuals, Lauren and Jane, both use the same computer….  In this scenario, subjects are more strongly inclined to judge that Jane caused the computer to crash than that Lauren did.” (page 512).

Posted in Causes, Experiments | 13 Comments »

Christian conservatives praying for Obama to die?

November 19, 2009 by jmsytsma

Apparently (sigh).  Story here.

Edit: Leiter notes a related story here.

Posted in News | 1 Comment »

I’ve been remiss…

November 16, 2009 by jmsytsma

I have been derelict as of late in producing new blog posts.  This is largely due to the time involved in being on the job market.  In fact, I have my departmental mock-interview today (and actually am rather looking forward to it).  This is unlikely to change over the next month or two, unfortunately; but, as the ideas (and projects) haven’t stopped flowing I hope that there will be an embarrassment of riches when I return to the blogosphere.  In the meantime, let me note something rather pedestrian (pun very much intended):

I recently splurged a bit and bought a pair of MBT shoes.  I had tried them out at a shoe store in California a couple of years ago, but didn’t take the plunge.  Then got a positive recommendation from Gualtiero Piccinini when I saw him wearing a pair at the last PSA.  Well, I finally took the plunge (it didn’t hurt that the prices on them had dropped over 50% from when I first tried them on).  And, despite still finding them to look a little bit strange, I love them.  They are easily the most comfortable shoes that I have ever worn.  I look forward to walking in them.  For someone with some back problems, as I have being hunched over books for so much of my days, I heartily recommend them.

mbt

Posted in News | 3 Comments »

Neural Correlates and Phenomenal Consciousness

October 13, 2009 by jmsytsma

I’ve posted a new paper considering research on neural correlates of consciousness, here.

In the paper I argue that the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is at the forefront of current scientific interest in consciousness.  It is frequently asserted that the NCC project is the starting point for a science of consciousness.  This is especially true for those researchers who aim to give a neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness—members of what I have termed the new science of consciousness.  Many prominent new scientists hold that the first step in developing such a theory is to find neural activity that specifically correlates with the contents of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness.   If these researchers are correct in their assessment of the importance of the NCC project, then the new science will rise or fall with the search for neural correlates of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.  In this paper, I assess the empirical prospects of this research project.  I challenge the claim that phenomenal consciousness exists, concluding that new scientists are erroneously trying to correlate neural activity with the contents of phenomenal consciousness.  To see this, we need to begin by articulating the phenomena that new scientists are interested in (the contents of phenomenal consciousness) and the data that are collected during NCC experiments (records of the behavioral reports of subjects and measures of their neural activity).  I argue that the data that are collected in these experiments are insufficient evidence to establish the reality of the hypothesized phenomena of interest.  This is shown by considering two alternative interpretations of the standard NCC experiment—viz. an eliminativist interpretation and a disjunctivist interpretation.

Comments welcome and appreciated!

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search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is at the forefront of current scientific interest in consciousness.  It is frequently asserted that the NCC project is the starting point for a science of consciousness.  This is especially true for those researchers who aim to give a neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness—members of what I have termed the new science of consciousness.  Many prominent new scientists hold that the first step in developing such a theory is to find neural activity that specifically correlates with the contents of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness.[1] If these researchers are correct in their assessment of the importance of the NCC project, then the new science will rise or fall with the search for neural correlates of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.  In this paper, I assess the empirical prospects of this research project.  I challenge the claim that phenomenal consciousness exists, concluding that new scientists are erroneously trying to correlate neural activity with the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

To see this, we need to begin by articulating the phenomena that new scientists are interested in (the contents of phenomenal consciousness) and the data that are collected during NCC experiments (records of the behavioral reports of subjects and measures of their neural activity).  I argue that the data that are collected in these experiments are insufficient evidence to establish the reality of the hypothesized phenomena of interest.  This is shown by considering two alternative interpretations of the standard NCC experiment—viz. an eliminativist interpretation and a disjunctivist interpretation.

[1] This is not the only goal that one can have in conducting research under the “NCC” label.  Nonetheless, the search for neural correlates of the contents of phenomenal consciousness is arguably the most common project amongst NCC researchers and has often been considered the standard NCC project.  For example, Jakob Hohwy writes (2007, 465, emphasis in the original): “The standard NCC approach is primarily interested in the neural substrate for having one rather another content represented in consciousness (e.g. a percept of a face rather than of a house).”  See Chalmers (1998, 2000), Hohwy (2007), and Rees (2007) for discussions of NCC research; see also the articles collected in Metzinger (2000).

Posted in Consciousness, Mind, Papers | 11 Comments »

Doom

October 9, 2009 by jmsytsma

Doom, doom, doom.  But, on the bright side, I have the one-hour Office wedding on Tivo!

Posted in Philosophy (generally) | Leave a Comment »

“Two Conceptions” available at SpringerLink

October 4, 2009 by jmsytsma

“Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience” has been published electronically and can be cited by DOI prior to print publication:

http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9439-x

Posted in Philosophy (generally) | Leave a Comment »

Bread Winner

October 2, 2009 by jmsytsma

What do you do after you win the bread?  Do you take it home?  Perhaps you should trade it for the bacon.

Posted in Thoughts | Leave a Comment »

Section Break: My Second 100 Tweets

September 27, 2009 by jmsytsma

(As noted here, I’ve been using Twitter to compile some sentences I have read and liked for one reason or another.  All have been stripped from their context.  Below I compile the second 100 sentences, with an occasional paragraph break for enhanced readability!  The first 100 sentences is available here.)

Goodnight frauds who don’t know they’re frauds and poets who don’t know their poets. This is what we are, and this is what we do. This is how it strikes me. Life’s struggles, each trying to push the other aside, and so win out. I will finally discover the truth. Our civilization thrives on stupidity. And because it amuses. And because pragmatism was a cold god. And paradigms rarely shift through an act of will. Signifier of higher intelligence, acknowledgment of community interests.  The level of self-justification required was staggering… and it seemed language itself was its greatest armor against common sense. Independent thought had been relinquished, with appalling eagerness… and in its place had risen a stolid resolve to question nothing. The shortest of memories. Better than ten thousand tireless contrivances. Enormous powers—powers even to make us believe in something that never happened.

We shall walk those ancient roads. You are so patient with me whilst we wander ever lost. They circumnavigated the globe, after all. It is a natural truth that some walk the road faster than others. Our headlong progress, as if motion was purpose and purpose inherently virtuous. Our lack of compassion, which we called being realistic. Your own flaw. Relevant? Equally pointless. In any case, the law is simple, as all true laws must be. The most basic laws of existence, after all, were always harsh. How can you maintain the illusion of journalistic impartiality when one of the political parties has jumped the shark? You are obsessed with laws. You are a terrible person who shouldn’t be allowed to give advice to anyone about anything. Even the fleas avoid you. You are very fat and stupid and persistently wear a ridiculous hat which you should be ashamed of. Hairy old women will steal your children… and chop them up and cook them with vegetables and tubers and a few precious threads of saffron.

I took thee for thy better. Don’t condescend to me, man. Let me explain. Saying nothing is a fine method for dealing with such confusion, to which each of you have agreed… even though it was a silent agreement. He knows his own ignorance and stupidity, so is ever suspicious of others, especially when they say things he does not understand. This is simply what we do. It is what we do. Way-making is an easy-flowing stream, which can run in any direction. A world without demand to challenge the confused haze of holy apathy. He is only mostly worthless. We’re facing a conundrum, my friend. Simply because of their preoccupation with staying alive. We can never match the ideals set before us. Between the swish of the tides, when giants knelt down and became mountains. Where all truths hide. That’s where I first met him, and saw immediately his lack of potential. Clarity ascends, achieving preeminence among all the important things. Things proliferate, and each again returns to its root. None of it has purchased a future claim to glory, none of it has earned you anything.

The individual must all the more forget himself, as the nature of Science implies and requires. A single building can become an entire world, the minds crowding and jostling, then clawing and gouging. Maybe not. Happily, neither waking nor dreaming mentation is part of one cosmic glob of thinking. It takes for granted ideas about cognition as an instrument or medium, assuming that there is a difference between ourselves and cognition.  Nothing is certain, barring the truth that men are wont to get lost in their illusions of grandeur. The underscored truth laid bare, grisly exposure from which was withheld any direct, honest examination. You did indeed manage to sink lower. I am better suited to manipulating objects than words. I am not immune to uncertainty. It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future. They wear ignorance like armor and wield spite like swords.

I distrust philosophy. Because I study philosophy, not literature. A scholar swimming across the ocean of history. It seems we may have to fly after all. Fire, the silent scream of light, the very swirl of the stars themselves. But the tread of time is itself a prison. Everything worth fighting for was gained without fighting. Said veracity is already a given. Philosophy is what you do when you don’t yet know what the right questions are to ask. What am I to do about this truth? We are bemused by an intrusive gaggle of persistent intuitions deriving from heaven knows where. Despondent sulk. The sufficientest reason of all. A beautiful rainbow remains a beautiful rainbow even after an explanation in terms of electromagnetic radiation has become available. It doesn’t exist. Who can trust what the eyes witness, after all? What a strange question to ask of a man. I really don’t know, in a way, what more conclusive evidence one can have about anything, ultimately speaking. Although it is P, my god it’s P, it’s also Q. Now, if mathematical evidence supports such practical observation, then we’re getting somewhere. When so many ‘obvious facts’ compete with each other, common sense is not enough. Maybe defining the love of wisdom as cultivating the soul is a classical motif that could inspire us… in the present situation.

I never include myself in my own generalizations. For Hegel does not believe in the subject as being some detached, substantival entity standing in varying relations to… its objects. The self waging battle against everything else. When the war is won, treat it as you would a funeral. Blowhards have no standing, the self-promoting are not distinguished, show-offs do not shine, the self-important are here and gone. I am ever the exception to the rule. I possess my own cleverness. Now you are being funny. Inviting suspicion on every law of causality generations of scholars had posited as irrefutable truth. The chair of my department appeared in a feather cap and wearing a plaid kilt, his weapon pointed as if he did not know what to do with it. It seems I am to be increasingly viewed as some kind of pivotal player in a game of which I have no comprehension. We bagged Mrs. Whittle’s beastie, aye, as plump a toad as e’er licked a witch’s happy sack. Why, the mere blowing clear of a nose is a potential source of ecstasy, once you grasp its phlegmatic allure. The most steadfast character seems dubious, the most pristine and authentic seems defiled. It seems that the disillusionment had begun.

Posted in How Tweet It Is | Leave a Comment »

Kauppinen on “Two Conceptions”

September 21, 2009 by jmsytsma

Antti Kauppinen has a long post (here or here) critiquing my recent paper with Edouard Machery, “Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience” (forthcoming, Philosophical Studies).

Posted in Experiments, Language, Metaphilosophy | Leave a Comment »

Philosophical Temperament

September 21, 2009 by jmsytsma

I have posted a draft of a new paper with Jonathan Livengood, Adam Feltz, and Edouard Machery on the PhilSci Archive, entitled “Philosophical Temperament.”  The paper is available here.  See here for a lively of the paper on the Experimental Philosophy blog. (No offense meant to the Twitterers!  In fact, follow me on Twitter @SomeSentences.)  Abstract below:

Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is. Often they have looked for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do. Given the diversity of topics and methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach. In this article we consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: What are philosophers like? Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that philosophers are especially reflective. This claim is supported by a study of more than 5,000 philosophers and non-philosophers, the results of which indicate that even when we control for overall education level, philosophers tend to be significantly more reflective than their peers. We then illustrate this tendency by considering what we know about the philosophizing of a few prominent philosophers. Recognizing this aspect of the philosophical temperament, it is natural to wonder how philosophers came to be this way: Does philosophical training teach reflectivity or do more reflective people tend to gravitate to philosophy? We consider the limitations of our data with respect to this question and suggest that a longitudinal study be conducted.

Posted in Experiments, Metaphilosophy, Papers | Leave a Comment »

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