Archive for September, 2008

Happy Banned Books Week

September 29, 2008

September 27 – October 4 marks the 27th annual Banned Books Week. The American Library Association writes:

BBW celebrates the freedom to choose or the freedom to express one’s opinion even if that opinion might be considered unorthodox or unpopular and stresses the importance of ensuring the availability of those unorthodox or unpopular viewpoints to all who wish to read them. After all, intellectual freedom can exist only where these two essential conditions are met.

What will you be reading?

I’ll be celebrating by reading a few banned books.  The ALA has a list for 2007-2008 here.  I’m thinking I’ll tackle Child of God by Cormac McCarthy (removed from pre-Advanced English Placement, Jim Ned High School, Tuscola, Texas), revisit Richard Wright’s Black Boy which I last read in my own AP English class (challened in Howell Michigan for strong sexual content), and finish with one of my absolute favorites — Philip Pullman’s His Dark Materials trilogy.  Pullman was a popular target:

Removed, but later returned to the library shelves at dozens of schools in the publicly funded Halton, Ontario, Canada, Catholic School District (2007) despite that the books were challenged as being “written by an atheist where the characters and text are anti-God, anti-Catholic, and anti-religion.” The book and two other Pullman titles from the Dark Materials trilogy were pulled from public display for review, but are available to students upon request. The publicly funded Calgary, Alberta, Canada, Catholic School District (2007) returned the book to its library shelves two months after ordering its removal. Detractors accused the book of having antireligious content. Similar concerns prompted the Catholic League, a Roman-Catholic anti-defamation organization in the U.S., to urge parents to boycott a movie version of the book that was released in December 2007. Challenged at the Conkwright Middle School in Winchester, Ky. (2007) because the main character drinks wine and ingests poppy with her meals, and the book presents an anti-Christian doctrine. Pulled from the St. John Neumann Middle School and Lourdes High School in Oshkosh, Wis. (2007) because of concerns about what critics call its “anti-Christian message.” Challenged at the Shallowater Middle School in Lubbock, Tex. (2007) because of the book’s “anti-religious messages.” Pulled from the library shelves at Ortega Middle School in Alamosa, Colo. (2007) for what critics regard as the book’s anti-religious views. District officials later returned the book to circulation. Retained by the publicly funded Dufferin-Peel Catholic School District in Mississauga, Ontario, Canada (2008) with a sticker on the inside cover telling readers “representations of the church in this novel are purely fictional,” and are not reflective of the real Roman Catholic Church or the Gospel of Jesus Christ. Source: Jan. 2008, pp. 13-14, 36; Mar. 2008, pp. 61, 63, 77-78; May 2008, pp. 99, 116.

If you haven’t read this brilliant, imaginative, and touching work yet, I can think of no better way to celebrate Banned Books Week.

Not so much a “Whoo Hoo!” Moment

September 26, 2008

In contemplating “what is by far the largest bank failure in American history” (story here), I’ve got to ask what is going to happen to my 1.9% fixed rate WaMu MasterCard?  That’s over 1.5% less than my savings account pays me on the money.  Apparently a big part of their problem was bad credit card loans… but didn’t they want me to default?  (The rate after a missed payment was a mere 21.9%)

Joking aside, though, this is ugly (here, here).

Joe Blow(hard)

September 25, 2008

I don’t want to give the impression of political favoritism (just because one side in the upcoming US presidential election disproportionally scares the crap out of me).  So, to be fair:
Why exactly did Joe Biden think he should be talking about history?

According to the AP, Biden said on Tuesday:

“When the stock market crashed, Franklin D. Roosevelt got on the television and didn’t just talk about the, you know, the princes of greed. He said, ‘Look, here’s what happened,’” Barack Obama’s running mate recently told the “CBS Evening News.”

Except, Republican Herbert Hoover was in office when the stock market crashed in October 1929. There also was no television at the time; TV wasn’t introduced to the public until a decade later, at the 1939 World’s Fair.

If only.  FDR was quite dashing.

Roosevelt, circa 1929, calms a national TV audience's fears about "the crash."

Roosevelt, circa 1929, calms a national TV audience's fears about "the crash."

Not Playing to Win

September 24, 2008

In a daring political maneuver, John McCain has decided that the best way to win in November is to suspend his campaign! That’s bound to work.  And it is clearly for the best…  because, you know, what the Senate needs right now is another politician trying to capitalize on crisis.

If I thought for a minute that this was sincere, I would have to ask: Why today? (It wouldn’t, by any chance, be the release of this morning’s ABC News poll showing Obama up 52% to 43%, would it???)

EDIT (9/25/08):

It has turned out that McCain’s “suspension” is even more of a blatant sham than I expected (and I am rather cynical).  Apparently, not only are McCain’s surrogates out on the cable news shows, attacking Obama while they are at it, but McCain’s ads are still running… and all of his offices are still up and running (see here).

So, by “suspension of his campaign” he meant something like “I’m tired of practicing for the debate and am going to do something more interesting instead.”  Not surprising, I suppose, that he would look to get out of doing homework given his fifth-from-bottom-of-class ranking at the United States Naval Academy.

EDIT (9/26/08):

Phew!  The campaign is back on.  Mission “get in the way and help make things even worse” accomplished?

Summer School

September 24, 2008

Chainsaw, “You passed and I failed! You asshole! How could you do that to me?”

Dave, “It was an accident. I’ll take it again. I can fail, I know I can.”

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Two of my fellow grad-students in Pitt HPS attended summer programs in Europe this year…

What Happened in Summer School (1987)

What Happened in Summer School (1987)

…and lived to tell us about it.

Jonathan Livengood studied Probabilistic Causality in Budapest, while Bryan Roberts delved into Philosophy of Physics in Geneva.  It sounds to me like it is well worth it for students to look into these summer opportunities, but let’s get the details straight from the horses mouth.

(Many thanks to Jonathan and Bryan for passing along these reports!)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summer School in Probabilistic Causality
Jonathan Livengood

Jonathan Livengood

Jonathan Livengood

I was recently in Budapest, Hungary, to attend a graduate summer school course on Probabilistic Causality, hosted by my friend and colleague Balazs Gyenis. Budapest is a lovely city. It is filled with odd little parks and green spaces, many with statues or other monuments decorated with brightly colored flowers. The architecture is quite nice, and there are quite a few beautiful old cathedrals, not to mention the neo-gothic Parliament building. Transportation in the city is excellent, and the people are generally courteous.

The course itself was interesting and diverse, both in terms of what was taught and in terms of who attended. The real depth of material was in physics. Several nice talks gave rigorous developments of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause. Other talks focused on challenges to this Principle raised by the EPR paradox. More superficial presentations covered causation in econometrics and history, along with my own interests in Bayes nets approaches to causal inference.

Parliament Building, Budapest

Parliament Building, Budapest

The vast majority of organizers, faculty, staff, and students were excellent people—knowledgeable and easy to talk to. Among the faculty, I especially appreciated Miklos Redei, Gabor Hofer-Szabo, Laszlo Szabo, and Damien Fennell. I had many pleasant conversations with students from around the world. In no particular order, those that spring to mind are Leszek Wronski, Bert Leuridan, Brian Woodcock, Claudio Mazzola, Samrat Bose, Luke Glynn, and Kathryn Plaisance. Of course, Balazs was invaluable as host and course administrator, and I enjoyed several good conversations, one until three or four in the morning, with him and Mike Tamir, who was also staying at Balazs’ apartment in the city. The interactions outside the classroom were at least as valuable to me as anything that happened during lectures or in-class discussions, many of which were dominated for good or ill by Laszlo.

Budapest, Hungary

Budapest, Hungary

On the whole, I was quite pleased with the program. (I also highly recommend playing soccer with the other students.) And I will make every effort to attend next year, provided it is offered again. However, it was not all sunshine and roses, and I would like to mention one disappointment. The largest disappointment was Richard Neapolitan. The man turned out to be an unprofessional buffoon. Not only did he refuse to attend the full two weeks of the summer school, despite the fact that he was actually in the city and had no good excuse, his presentations were superficial and trivial in the extreme. Though the students and faculty were overwhelmingly philosophers, Neapolitan refused point-blank to engage with philosophical issues. Moreover, he wore his ignorance about philosophy as a badge of honor. This led him to assert that he did not believe in causation and that probability—in contrast to causation—is well-understood. To make matters worse, he was insulting and rude to the organizers, to the students, and even to the other faculty. I hope never to see his name on a list of presenters or conference attendees in the rest of my professional career.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Summer School in Philosophy of Physics
Bryan Roberts

Bryan Roberts

Bryan Roberts

The Geneva Summer School in Philosophy of Physics, 2008 was a 1-week intensive summer school in the middle of the Swiss alps. This year, from July 27th to August 2nd, 2008, scholars and graduate students met in Arolla’s Hotel Mont-Collon for a conference on the nature of space and time. I had the honor to participate, thanks to a generous grant from the Wesley and Merilee Salmon Foundation. What follows is my report on what happened there.

Overview.
Like much of the philosophy of physics, the Geneva Summer School in Philosophy of Physics this year was inspired by one of those questions that lies near the border of science and the ineffable: What is the nature of space and time? Philosophers make this kind of question more concrete by asking about identity, causation, substance, and dynamical evolution in space and time, as well as about the historical and physical foundations of our best theories.

The strategy of the program was to take some of the top thinkers on these subjects, mix them together with a few dozen graduate students, and stick them all alone in the mountains for a week to work things out. The speakers included Jeremy Butterfield, Dennis Dieks, Nick Huggett, Vincent Lam, Stephan Leuenberger, John Norton, Carlo Rovelli, and Christian Wuthrich. The result was a lively, productive, challenging event, which can hardly be captured by a brief online summary. But I’m going to give it a try.

A typical day consisted of four talks about space and time, each one about an hour long. We came prepared having completed hundreds of pages of reading, so that for half an hour after each talk, there was an interesting and wide-ranging discussion of the presentation. It was very intellectually demanding, but never tiring, as the organizers had the excellent foresight to recharge us with coffee and snacks or a meal after each discussion. The coffee and snacks were on the sunny hotel patio, at the base of three or four dramatic glacial peaks. The meals were in the rustic, lodge-like hotel dining room. For a philosopher of physics, it just doesn’t get more glorious than that.

Selected Highlights
The Geneva Summer School was a fun, interesting, inspiring event that gave dozens of young philosophers of physics a chance to experience what really makes this field great. A blow-by-blow recap simply wouldn’t do it justice. So here are a few selected snapshots to give you a little taste.

The Very Middle of Nowhere

The Very Middle of Nowhere

The Very Middle of Nowhere. Everyone seemed to agree that a lot of the magic of this event was in the location: the Geneva Summer School in Philosophy of Physics is in Arolla, Switzerland which is arguably in the running for the title of the Very Middle of Nowhere. Arolla is dramatically perched at 2000 meters in the Swiss Alps. It contains a convenience store, three small hotels, a souvenir shop and a handful of chalets.

If you would have told me prior to arriving in Arolla that I would be trapped among a hord of philosophers of physics with nowhere to go, I might have been nervous. But the result was delightful: we were all immersed a nearly constant stream of raw, over-the-table philosophical banter — you might call it philosophy in its purest form. And we all walked away with permanent new friends in the field.

There is a delightful phenomenon that came out of this, which was unusually common at the Geneva Summer School. A handful of philosophers would come together, interact for a while, generating masses of exciting ideas about the philosophy of physics, and then would be flung apart again toward some other adventure: a lecture, a meal, a hike, etc. It was kind of like n- interacting bodies in a chaotic dynamical system.

An example: one evening after dinner, about a dozen philosophers of physics stumbled downstairs to huddle intently around a large oak bar table in the smokey hotel basement. Chris Wuthrich sat on my right clutching a beer, Nick Hugget sat across from him. All three of us were surrounded by summer school participants.

It Can't Wobble

It Can't Wobble

”It can’t wobble,” said one participant. “The principle of relativity forbids it.”

He was talking about a ball rolling at relativistic speeds without slipping, a question that I had recently begun to dwell on. Such a ball assumes an oblong-ish shape, due to length contraction. But as the participant pointed out, it doesn’t wobble, if the Principle of Relativity is going to be preserved. My question was: why? What are the rotational dynamics of such a ball?

Comments and analyses flew around the table, and a solution soon emerged in terms of the asymmetric mass distribution of the relativistic rolling ball. The discussion was fantastic. And within the hour, each of the n-bodies were flung apart again, off to climb some other intellectual peak.

Identity Through Time

Identity Through Time

Identity Through Time. The Swiss coffee they served us in the morning was strong. Very strong. So when Christian made the announcement that the morning lecture was beginning, I bounced effortlessly with my to the adjacent conference room. There, Jeremy was preparing a defense of the perdurantist view of identity. Identity is a debate that traditional philosophers have discussed for decades. Jeremy is one of the noble few who is doing this debate an important service, by showing what our best physical theories have to say about these matters.

Jeremy began by discussing how a common argument against perdurantism (called the Rotating Discs Argument — summarized here) simply breaks down from the perspective of General Relativity. On the other hand, he expressed some sympathy towards the argument that the perdurantist doesn’t seem capable of making sense of an object’s velocity. But he was able to produce some results, which show that if the perdurantist takes identity to be temporally extended — that is, based on a length (rather than a moment) of time — then this argument against perdurantism can be overcome. It was a lovely example of finally bringing some concrete physics to bear on an old philosophical debate.

However, the discussion session afterward illuminated another interesting feature of Jeremy’s talk. The debate seemed strange to Carlo Rovelli, who pointed out that one almost never really takes a physical quantity to be a finitely extended “object” — all of our best physical theories are field theories! This led John Norton to make a very interesting suggestion: might this same debate be carried out for quantities other than objects? How can we describe the identity of a quantity like, say, “energy” through time? These kinds of questions bring philosophy to bear on physics, in order to learn something about fundamental physical quantities. I found myself intrigued that this debate might be a two-way interface between these two areas of study.

Settling a Debate. There are a lot of different ways to do philosophy of physics, and there were many excellent representatives at the Geneva Summer School. We saw philosophical issues tied tightly to historical developments: Dennis Dieks’ discussion of Mach’s principle and the Einstein Universe; John Norton’s illustration of how Einstein discovered his field equations; and Nick Huggett’s introduction to the spacetime relationism. There were some technical results, such as Jeremy Butterfield’s result that some perdurantists can define velocity, and Dennis Dieks’ analysis of how spacetime symmetries are related to simultaneity. Some people focused on highly metaphysical issues, such as Stephan Leuenberger’s account of causation, and Vincent Lam’s argument for moderate structural realism. And their were more — all of which had their own virtues.

Settling a Debate

Settling a Debate

However, one of the most original approaches to settling a debate came in John Norton’s talk. After presenting his deflationary account of causation, John turned to all of us and asked: “Why don’t we try something new.” Rather than the usual back-and-forth, John suggested that we just put the idea to a vote. He gave us three options: 1) You think this is completely crazy; 2) You think this is so obvious it’s almost trivial; or 3) You’re not sure what to think. When it came around to the third option, I raised my hand high. John is always very convincing, but I always feel in uncertain territory when it comes to causation. So did everyone else, apparently. So we launched into the usual back-and-forth.

Philosophers on Ice

Philosophers on Ice

Philosophers On Ice. When most of what you know about someone comes from sitting around a conference table, it’s always pleasantly surprising to see what happens when you meet them again outdoors. Arolla, Switzerland is outdoors in a big way. And one afternoon, the organizers rallied the troops for a hike to a nearby glacier. The path was no more than a few kilometers. But it wasn’t a walk in the park, either — huge boulders stood between us and our glacier, and the only way around them was to go right over the top. As it turns out, boulders are no obstacle to philosophers of physics. I was struck as we scrambled from rock to rock at the resilience of my colleagues. As it turns out, they all seemed to have the same strategy that I do, which says that, when there’s a mountain in the way, you just lower your head and charge over it. Maybe it’s a philosopher of physics thing.

After conquering the glacier, many wandered back to the hotel, but a few decided to look for more mountains to conquer. The latter didn’t have to look very far: there was a 4-hour hike straight up standing right in front of us. So half a dozen adventure-seekers (myself included) set out to summit the mountain. When I reached the top, I was rewarded with a view of the alps that could have been the moon, together with a riveting conversation about the gravitational analogue of the Aharanov-Bohm effect. Sheep were baa-ing on the trail below us. It was an unforgettably Swiss experience — a Swissperience, if you will.

Conclusion.
The Geneva Summer School in Philosophy of Physics really began several weeks before the actual event, when we began preparing with huge tomes of assigned reading about the philosophy of space and time. That preparation was crucial to making the event great. The moment I arrived in Arolla, I was suddenly surrounded by dozens of people immersed in the same studies as I was. The lectures helped us to focus our thoughts, and by the end of the week, I think we all had developed a broad and deeply rooted picture of this exciting field.One of the stated goals of the summer school was to take our education in the philosophy of physics to a new level. When I entered, I thought of myself as a graduate student just beginning to get ahold of a few topics in the philosophy of spacetime. I left feeling like this was something I’d like to do for a living. For that, I would like to express my sincerest thanks and appreciation to the Wesley and Merilee Salmon Foundation, and to the History and Philosophy of Science faculty at the University of Pittsburgh, for giving me this experience.

Welcome to My Domain

September 23, 2008

I’ve recently moved my academic Website to www.JustinSytsma.com (or jsytsma.com for short).

I’ve also ponied up for a domain name for this blog: www.mymindismadeup.net (or madeupmind.net for short).

Interdisciplinary Approach to Philosophical Issues

September 22, 2008

I’m on my way back from the 1st Annual Interdisciplinary Approach to Philosophical Issues Conference at the University of South Alabama. I had a great time… and heard about some very cool work. In the next few weeks I’m planning to put down some thoughts concerning Joshua Knobe’s work on “The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment” (I think he has made a strong case for a pervasive impact, here, but I wonder if this reflects any more than that there is more conversational implicature concerning judgment than we might have thought) and some thoughts related to Adam Feltz’s work correlating personality traits with philosophical judgments (specifically, if this is correct, and accepting the evidence that there is regional variation in personality traits, does this raise significant worries about the prevalent practice of convenience sampling in experimental philosophy?).

In the meantime, here are some photos:

Witchhunting!?

September 21, 2008

Obviously, the news story right now is our economic chickens coming home to roost (and, in the process, deregulation conservatives morphing into socialists). Nonetheless, the story that has got my attention is Governor Palin’s connection to a pastor — the one who laid hands on her and called on God to make her governor — who made a name for himself by hunting witches. Really. Magical, spell-casting, action-at-a-distance-wielding witches. Hannah Strange, aptly named for reporting on this story, writes (full article here):

The pastor whose prayer Sarah Palin says helped her to become governor of Alaska founded his ministry with a witchhunt against a Kenyan woman who he accused of causing car accidents through demonic spells.

At a speech at the Wasilla Assembly of God on June 8 this year, Mrs Palin described how Thomas Muthee had laid his hands on her when he visited the church as a guest preacher in late 2005, prior to her successful gubernatorial bid.

In video footage of the speech, she is seen saying: “As I was mayor and Pastor Muthee was here and he was praying over me, and you know how he speaks and he’s so bold. And he was praying “Lord make a way, Lord make a way.”

“And I’m thinking, this guy’s really bold, he doesn’t even know what I’m going to do, he doesn’t know what my plans are. And he’s praying not “oh Lord if it be your will may she become governor,” no, he just prayed for it. He said “Lord make a way and let her do this next step. And that’s exactly what happened.”

Muthee bills himself as a Bishop for the Word of Faith Church. According to their website, the church “begun in 1989 February… after nine concrete months of prayers and fasting by Bishop Thomas Muthee and his late wife Margaret Muthee. God spoke to them when they were living in Scotland to come and begin ministry work in Kenya.” Of his more amazing feats, Muthee struck out against a demonic presence in Kiambu, Kenya. Strange continues:

According to the Christian Science Monitor, six months of fervent prayer and research identified the source of the witchcraft as a local woman called Mama Jane, who ran a “divination” centre called the Emmanuel Clinic.

Her alleged involvement in fortune-telling and the fact that she lived near the site of a number of fatal car accidents led Pastor Muthee to publicly declare her a witch responsible for the town’s ills, and order her to offer her up her soul for salvation or leave Kiambu.

Says the Monitor, “Muthee held a crusade that “brought about 200 people to Christ”. They set up round-the-clock prayer intercession in the basement of a grocery store and eventually, says the pastor “the demonic influence – the ‘principality’ over Kiambu –was broken”, and Mama Jane fled the town.

According to accounts of the witchhunt circulated on evangelical websites such as Prayer Links Ministries, after Pastor Muthee declared Mama Jane a witch, the townspeople became suspicious and began to turn on her, demanding that she be stoned. Public outrage eventually led the police to raid her home, where they fired gunshots, killing a pet python which they believed to be a demon.

After Mama Jane was questioned by police – and released – she decided it was time to leave town, the account says.

Wow. This story broke on the 16th, Olbermann picked it up on Countdown on Friday, but it just isn’t getting play (perhaps understandably given other events this week). But: Obama was skewered for having a pastor who decried how the US had treated black people (alluding, in the oft repeated line about 9/11 and America’s chickens coming home to roost, to the famous speech by Malcolm X and his response to a question about the assassination of JFK). Are they now going to give Palin a pass on (and it is insane that I am about to type this word) WITCHUNTING?!?!

Rogue Nation Spain

September 18, 2008

I’m glad to see that (as of this morning) the national media is not picking up on the supposed McCain “uber-gaffe” being pushed by left-leaning blogs (such as here).  So, McCain implied that Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero is the leader of a rogue Latin American nation (listen in here).  What’s the big deal?  I don’t know about yours, but my map puts Spain off the coast of Panama.

The Proper Province of Philosophy

September 18, 2008

I’ll be leaving tomorrow for the 1st Annual Interdisciplinary Approach to Philosophical Issues Conference at the University of South Alabama. Looks like there will be a number of interesting talks, including Josh Knobe’s keynote on The Pervasive Impact of Moral Judgment.  The theme of the conference is, “At the Crossroads of Philosophy and Psychology.”

I’ll be presenting a paper Saturday entitled, The Proper Province of Philosophy: Conceptual Analysis and Experimental Philosophy.

I will argue that there is a problem for a certain project in philosophy. I target one brand of conceptual analysis—what I call anti-empirical conceptual analysis—which seeks to draw out the logical interconnections between the meanings of terms, thereby determining what combinations make sense. The practitioners of anti-empirical conceptual analysis aim to answer conceptual questions, and these are seen as being strictly distinct from empirical questions. To conduct the analysis, however, the practitioner first needs to know what the relevant terms mean, including their conditions of application. If we accept the Wittgensteinian slogan that meaning is use (as these practitioners do), it seems that what the term means must be in part an empirical question. In particular, it would seem that the accuracy of a proposed condition of application for a term must depend on how the relevant linguistic community uses—or is willing to use—it. If this is correct, then conceptual analysis cannot stand prior to empirical investigation and conceptual questions cannot be cleanly separated away from empirical questions.

To avoid this conclusion and maintain that conceptual analysis is independent of empirical considerations, a proponent of anti-empirical conceptual analysis would need to deny that empirical enquiry has a role to play in confirming the accuracy of the conditions of application for terms. To do so one could propose some other (non-empirical) means of checking their accuracy, or one could claim that such checking is unneeded. As no nonempirical test seems to be forthcoming, I focus on the latter option. A proponent of anti-empirical conceptual analysis could respond by claiming that competent speakers of a language have mastered the use of its common terms and, as such, are in a position to definitively articulate the correct conditions of application for those terms. Note that this is a very strong claim in that it asserts that competent speakers have what amounts to linguistic infallibility, at least as concerns those common terms that are of philosophical interest. For this to be true, however, there would have to be agreement between competent speakers about the conditions of application for these terms (since, otherwise, at least one competent speaker would be fallible). As such, the occurrence of a disagreement about the central meaning of philosophically interesting common terms between seemingly competent speakers would pose a big problem for the proponent of anti-empirical conceptual analysis. If such a disagreement were to occur, their choices would be to offer a principled reason for denying that one of the parties is actually a competent speaker or to accept that we need a way to check the accuracy of proposed conditions of application for terms. Again, it does not seem that a non-empirical criterion for the former is likely to be forthcoming. If this is correct, then such a disagreement between competent speakers should push the proponent of conceptual analysis to accept that conceptual questions are not independent of empirical considerations. Of course, such disagreements are not just possible, but actually occur.

Interestingly, one such disagreement is at the heart of Max Bennett and Peter Hacker’s (2003, 2007) critique of language use in modern neuroscience: They assert that while psychological predicates only logically apply to some whole living animals (I will refer to this as the animal restriction), cognitive neuroscientists and experimental psychologists habitually apply these terms to other types of entities. This is interesting because Bennett and Hacker are prominent advocates of exactly the form of anti-empirical conceptual analysis that I have been discussing.