October 13, 2009 by jmsytsma
I’ve posted a new paper considering research on neural correlates of consciousness, here.
In the paper I argue that the search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is at the forefront of current scientific interest in consciousness. It is frequently asserted that the NCC project is the starting point for a science of consciousness. This is especially true for those researchers who aim to give a neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness—members of what I have termed the new science of consciousness. Many prominent new scientists hold that the first step in developing such a theory is to find neural activity that specifically correlates with the contents of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness. If these researchers are correct in their assessment of the importance of the NCC project, then the new science will rise or fall with the search for neural correlates of the contents of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I assess the empirical prospects of this research project. I challenge the claim that phenomenal consciousness exists, concluding that new scientists are erroneously trying to correlate neural activity with the contents of phenomenal consciousness. To see this, we need to begin by articulating the phenomena that new scientists are interested in (the contents of phenomenal consciousness) and the data that are collected during NCC experiments (records of the behavioral reports of subjects and measures of their neural activity). I argue that the data that are collected in these experiments are insufficient evidence to establish the reality of the hypothesized phenomena of interest. This is shown by considering two alternative interpretations of the standard NCC experiment—viz. an eliminativist interpretation and a disjunctivist interpretation.
Comments welcome and appreciated!
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search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is at the forefront of current scientific interest in consciousness. It is frequently asserted that the NCC project is the starting point for a science of consciousness. This is especially true for those researchers who aim to give a neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness—members of what I have termed the new science of consciousness. Many prominent new scientists hold that the first step in developing such a theory is to find neural activity that specifically correlates with the contents of a subject’s phenomenal consciousness. If these researchers are correct in their assessment of the importance of the NCC project, then the new science will rise or fall with the search for neural correlates of the contents of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I assess the empirical prospects of this research project. I challenge the claim that phenomenal consciousness exists, concluding that new scientists are erroneously trying to correlate neural activity with the contents of phenomenal consciousness.
To see this, we need to begin by articulating the phenomena that new scientists are interested in (the contents of phenomenal consciousness) and the data that are collected during NCC experiments (records of the behavioral reports of subjects and measures of their neural activity). I argue that the data that are collected in these experiments are insufficient evidence to establish the reality of the hypothesized phenomena of interest. This is shown by considering two alternative interpretations of the standard NCC experiment—viz. an eliminativist interpretation and a disjunctivist interpretation.
Posted in Consciousness, Mind, Papers | 6 Comments »
October 9, 2009 by jmsytsma
Doom, doom, doom. But, on the bright side, I have the one-hour Office wedding on Tivo!
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October 4, 2009 by jmsytsma
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October 2, 2009 by jmsytsma
What do you do after you win the bread? Do you take it home? Perhaps you should trade it for the bacon.
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September 21, 2009 by jmsytsma
I have posted a draft of a new paper with Jonathan Livengood, Adam Feltz, and Edouard Machery on the PhilSci Archive, entitled “Philosophical Temperament.” The paper is available here. See here for a lively of the paper on the Experimental Philosophy blog. (No offense meant to the Twitterers! In fact, follow me on Twitter @SomeSentences.) Abstract below:
Many philosophers have worried about what philosophy is. Often they have looked for answers by considering what it is that philosophers do. Given the diversity of topics and methods found in philosophy, however, we propose a different approach. In this article we consider the philosophical temperament, asking an alternative question: What are philosophers like? Our answer is that one important aspect of the philosophical temperament is that philosophers are especially reflective. This claim is supported by a study of more than 5,000 philosophers and non-philosophers, the results of which indicate that even when we control for overall education level, philosophers tend to be significantly more reflective than their peers. We then illustrate this tendency by considering what we know about the philosophizing of a few prominent philosophers. Recognizing this aspect of the philosophical temperament, it is natural to wonder how philosophers came to be this way: Does philosophical training teach reflectivity or do more reflective people tend to gravitate to philosophy? We consider the limitations of our data with respect to this question and suggest that a longitudinal study be conducted.
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September 21, 2009 by jmsytsma
Tom Pashby kicked off the new season of Pitt HPS Work in Progress talks on Friday, with a critical look at Rovelli’s relational quantum mechanics. For those of you not in Pittsburgh, or who couldn’t make it to the talk, he has posted a discussion of this work at the HPS WIP blog, WIPLASH. It is well worth a read!
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September 17, 2009 by jmsytsma
I will be giving a presentation tomorrow at Rutgers as part of a series put together by the Metro Experimental Research Group. This is one of several fantastic new efforts (like the upcoming Experiment Month) to promote experimental philosophy by encouraging and helping philosophers to start running their own studies. Here is a description of the group:
The Metro Experimental Research Group (MERG) seeks to help philosophy graduate students and early-career professors apply experimental and quantitative methods to topics of philosophical research. Initially, we hope to identify philosophers who support such research by launching a series of introductory meetings, to be held in the fall of 2009, at schools in the greater New York area (liberally construed, so as to include, for example, Yale and Rutgers). Subsequently, we will pursue various projects to aid participant scholars with their experimental (and otherwise empirical) research. We will put philosophers in touch with philosophically minded psychologists and cognitive scientists who are willing to help develop research programs of philosophical relevance. We will set up participant pools, so that experimenters can share their experimental participants with one another, thus expanding their research power. We will arrange for guest talks by important figures in the field of experimental philosophy. Perhaps most importantly, we will facilitate regular meetings in the metro area, where philosophers can present their ongoing experimental research to supportive colleagues. Together we will brainstorm new and better avenues of research.
My presentation, entitled “Folk Psychology and Phenomenal Consciousness,” will survey some recent empirical work on the folk theory of consciousness, focusing on my own research on the topic — past, present, and future. Slides of the talk are available here.
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September 14, 2009 by jmsytsma
My paper “Two Conceptions of Subjective Experience” with Edouard Machery has been accepted for publication in Philosophical Studies. Abstract is below; the preprint of the article is available on the PhilSci Archive (here).
Do philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in the same way? In this article, we argue that they do not and that the philosophical concept of phenomenal consciousness does not coincide with the folk conception. We first offer experimental support for the hypothesis that philosophers and ordinary people conceive of subjective experience in markedly different ways. We then explore experimentally the folk conception, proposing that for the folk, subjective experience is closely linked to valence. We conclude by considering the implications of our findings for a central issue in the philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness.
Edit: Joshua Knobe discusses the article (here) at the experimental philosophy blog.
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